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Human culture has evolved through a series of major tipping points in information storage
and communication. The first was the appearance of language, which enabled communi-
cation between brains and allowed humans to specialize in what they do and to participate
in complex mating games. The second was information storage outside the brain, most
obviously expressed in the “Upper Paleolithic Revolution” – the sudden proliferation of
cave art, personal adornment, and ritual in Europe some 35,000–45,000 years ago. More
recently, this storage has taken the form of writing, mass media, and now the Internet,
which is arguably overwhelming humans’ ability to discern relevant information. The third
tipping point was the appearance of technology capable of accumulating and manipulat-
ing vast amounts of information outside humans, thus removing them as bottlenecks to
a seemingly self-perpetuating process of knowledge explosion. Important components of
any discussion of cultural evolutionary tipping points are tempo and mode, given that the
rate of change, as well as the kind of change, in information storage and transmission has
not been constant over the previous million years.
Keywords: cultural transmission, information, mode, tempo, tipping points
INTRODUCTION
In Kurzweil’s (2005) best-selling book, The Singularity is Near, the
well-known inventor and futurist predicts that by the year 2040
people will be able to upload their brains onto computers – just
one of many incredible changes portrayed for popular audiences
in Barry Ptolomy’s 2009 movie, Transcendent Man. Are Kurzweil
and other popular futurists crackpots, or are they seeing some-
thing that many of us are not, even if some of the conclusions they
draw are improbable at best? We would argue that if nothing else,
they are drawing attention to a subject that is often overlooked
in the social sciences, the future trajectory of cultural evolution.
Those of us with a scientific interest in the evolution of culture
(e.g., Mesoudi et al., 2004; Shennan, 2009; Whiten et al., 2011;
Perreault, 2012) do well when discussing the past, but are we able
to address the most poignant uncertainty of cultural evolution,
namely, where might humanity be headed?
Here we pick up on that topic, using as a framework the con-
cept of “tipping points,” a term made popular through Gladwell’s
(2000) book of that title but which has well-established roots in
sociology (e.g., Grodzins, 1958) and wide modern currency in cli-
matology (e.g., Lenton et al., 2008; Russill and Nyssa, 2009; Lenton,
2011; Barnosky et al., 2012; Huntington et al., 2012). As Lamberson
and Page (2012) point out, however, the term often is used collo-
quially to refer to unspecified “milestones” in such things as the
economy (Hauser, 2011), markets (Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003),
fashion (Gladwell, 2000), and the like, usually in concert with per-
ceived sudden upturns in logistic (S-shaped) curves. As earnest as
these applications are, they are wide of the mark in terms of what a
tipping point is. We use the term more in the climatological sense,
defining it as a critical threshold at which a tiny perturbation
qualitatively and irreversibly alters the state or development of a
system. This alteration occurs at some time downstream – per-
haps well downstream – of the perturbation. The alteration may
(or may not) manifest itself as a discontinuity on a logistic curve,
depending on the scale at which the curve is plotted (Lamberson
and Page, 2012).
We certainly are not the first to identify critical points in
human evolution (e.g., Tobias, 1991; Johanson and Edgar, 1996;
Modis, 2002), nor are such identifications restricted to the recent
decades. The writings of Enlightenment scholars – Locke, Diderot,
Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu – are replete with examples of
cultural “betterment” that eventually “tips” humans irreversibly to
the next level of development. Montesquieu, for example, divided
early mankind into savages and barbarians, and Turgot proposed
a three-phase system of hunting, pastoralism, and agriculture.
Later, the cultural evolutionists of the nineteenth century devel-
oped elaborate evolutionary schemes to pigeonhole ethnic groups
and to identify the necessary cultural traits that“caused”a group to
eventually move up from, say, savagery to barbarism (e.g., Morgan,
1877). Later still, archeologist Childe (1936) drew up a list of cri-
teria that a group had to possess to be transformed into a “civiliza-
tion,” among which were the plow, metal smelting, draft animals,
writing, a calendar, irrigation agriculture, specialized craftsmen,
and urban centers. A contemporary scheme by anthropologist
White (1943) focused on the harnessing of more and more energy –
first human muscle, followed by domesticated animals, plants,
natural resources (coal and gas), and nuclear – as the catalyst for
tipping points in cultural evolution. Not surprisingly, what grew
out of these schemes was a cascade of supposed “revolutions” –
the “Neolithic Revolution” (Childe, 1925), the “Urban Revolution”
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(Childe, 1950), and the “Agricultural Revolution” (Allen, 1999),
among many others (e.g., “commercial,” “intellectual,” “political,”
“industrial,” and “transportation” revolutions (see Ross and Tontz,
1948).
As important as these transitions undoubtedly were in the evo-
lution of culture, we adopt a different view in that we concentrate
on only two key features – information storage and communi-
cation. We see all other features as derivative. We identify three
tipping points on the trajectory of human cultural evolution. The
first was the appearance of language and the cognitive capabilities
that accompanied it, which enabled hominins not only to “live
inside their heads” (Brooks, 2010, p. 3) but also to communicate
rapidly and reliably with other hominin brains. The second tipping
point was information storage outside the brain, most obviously
expressed in the “Upper Paleolithic Revolution” – the sudden pro-
liferation of symbolic and technological complexity that occurred
in western Eurasia some 45,000 years ago (Powell et al., 2009)
and sporadically in sub-Saharan Africa even earlier (Jacobs et al.,
2008). Later, information storage took the form of writing, mass
media, and now the Internet, which is arguably overwhelming any
ability to discern relevant information (Hemp, 2009). The third
tipping point was the appearance of technology capable of accu-
mulating and manipulating vast amounts of information outside
humans (Donoghue, 2008), thus removing them as bottlenecks
to a self-perpetuating process of knowledge explosion. In essence,
the current stage of information technology is simply a waypoint
in a long process that began well over a million years ago and that
was driven by the interaction of genes and culture.
GENES AND CULTURE IN HUMAN EVOLUTION
Social scientists have long known the power that culture exerts in
shaping the human condition (Tylor, 1871; Wissler, 1923; Kroeber,
1952; White, 1959), but it is becoming increasingly clear that the
interactions of genes and culture – literally, their coevolution –
offer a faster and stronger mode of human evolution than either
does by itself (Durham, 1991; Ehrlich, 2000; Richerson and Boyd,
2005; Laland, 2008; Laland et al., 2010; Richerson et al., 2010; Ihara,
2011; Rendell et al., 2011). Gene–culture theory is a branch of the-
oretical population genetics that incorporates cultural traits into
models of differential transmission of genes from one generation
to the next (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richer-
son, 1985; Feldman and Laland, 1996; Richerson and Boyd, 2005;
Laland et al., 2010; Richerson et al., 2010). The two inheritance
systems cannot always be treated independently because (1) what
an individual learns may depend on his or her genotype expressed
throughout development and (2) selection acting on the genetic
system may be generated or modified by the spread of a cultural
trait (O’Brien and Laland, 2012). Culture is treated as informa-
tion – for example, knowledge, beliefs, and skills – that is capable of
affecting the behavior of individuals and which they acquire from
other individuals through any of a number of social learning path-
ways, including teaching and imitation (Laland, 2004; Richerson
and Boyd, 2005).
Gene–culture theorists model cultural transmission as a Dar-
winian process in which there is selective retention of favorable
cultural variants (Boyd and Richerson, 1985), with accompany-
ing effects on biological fitness. Recognition is given to the fact
that other, non-selective processes such as mutation (invention,
innovation), spread (diffusion), and drift (random change) play
significant roles as well (Shennan, 2002; Bentley et al., 2004). Mul-
tiple animal species are able to learn, and a good number of them
exhibit evidence of processes important to cultural transmission
(Heyes, 1994, 2012; Galef and Laland, 2005; Laland and Reader,
2010; Whiten et al., 2011; Nielsen et al., 2012), but it is the fact that
human culture evolves quickly and is cumulative (Enquist et al.,
2011) that makes it an exceptional case. By this we mean that one
generation does things in a certain way, and the next generation,
instead of starting from scratch, does them in more or less the same
way, perhaps with slight modification or improvement. The suc-
ceeding generation learns the modified version,which then persists
across generations until further changes are made (Richerson and
Boyd, 2005; Tennie et al., 2009). Cultural transmission is thus char-
acterized by the so-called “ratchet effect,” in which modifications
and improvements stay in the population until further changes
ratchet things up again (Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 1999).
Selection pressures derived from culture can be stronger than
non-cultural ones for at least two reasons. First, because there is
highly reliable transmission of cultural information between indi-
viduals, culturally modified selective environments can produce
unusually strong natural selection that is directionally consistent
over time (Bersaglieri et al., 2004). Second, cultural innovations
tend to spread more quickly than genetic mutations because social
learning usually operates at a much faster rate (Feldman and
Laland, 1996; Perreault, 2012). If cultural practices modify selec-
tion on human genes, the more individuals exhibiting a trait,
the greater the intensity of selection will be on a gene (Laland
et al., 2010). Gene–culture coevolutionary models repeatedly
demonstrate more-rapid responses to selection than conventional
population-genetic models, which helps explain the argument that
culture has accelerated human evolution (Hawks et al.,2007). Con-
versely, under different circumstances, culture can also slow down
genetic change (Feldman and Laland, 1996).
Gene–culture theorists face challenges similar to those of cli-
mate modelers when it comes to looking into the future. Both rely
on the past for data points. Whereas climatologists tune their fore-
cast models using ice cores and other ancient paleoclimatological
records, gene–culture theorists rely on past millennia of gene–
culture evolution as some guide to where the future leads (Laland
et al., 2010; Richerson et al., 2010; O’Brien and Laland, 2012). This
is reasonable, but there is a caveat: as good Bayesian reasoners, we
may misunderstand the oncoming rush of the future because the
past has sluggishly dragged on for the vast temporal portion of
human evolution (Jones and Love, 2011)1. But if we look at the
prehistoric past and compress its slow timescale, we see that the
mind-boggling sci-fi possibilities of the present and future have
1Indeed, the dead hand of the past places so many past observations into the
Bayesian updating mechanism over a long distant past that it essentially acts as
if it almost ignores the near past, which sensible forecasters would use to forecast
the future, especially when the environment is rapidly changing. This is sometimes
called “panacea-like” behavior in other contexts (Brock and Carpenter, 2007), but
it is relevant in any adaptive system with Bayesian-like updaters. Compressing the
slow time scale of a long past can be viewed as a mechanism to put more weight on
observations from the near past, which are more relevant for helping us peer into
the future, especially in a rapidly changing world like the one at present.
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prehistoric precedents. This compression, or logarithmic scaling,
is common in the sciences. For example, John B. Sparks used it
to create his spectacular one-page Histomap of Evolution, point-
ing out that “the most recent periods of evolution hold the most
interest for us. We need therefore increasingly more space for our
outline the nearer we approach modern times, and the logarithmic
scale fulfills just this condition” (Sparks, 1932, p. 1).
Sparks was correct: by logarithmically scaling human evolution,
we begin to see some of the prehistoric precedents (Cavalli-Sforza
et al., 1994). The elimination of fear by modern neuropharma-
cology (Quirk and Mueller, 2008), for example, might seem a
Brave New World (Huxley, 1932) possibility, but fear-reducing
drugs have been common for decades, not to mention the fact
that alcoholic drinks had a Neolithic origin (Dietler, 2006). The
onset of the Neolithic around 11,000 B.C. (Bellwood, 2005) was,
in fact, one of the more dramatic periods in gene–culture coevo-
lution, as humans and their domesticated plants and animals
began to coevolve on a millennial timescale (Zeder et al., 2006).
In archeological sequences across the Northern Hemisphere, the
emergence of agriculture coincides with a noticeable increase in
artifactual remains, which has long been interpreted as indicating
a spurt in demographic growth. Hemispheric cemetery data pro-
vide direct evidence of a major demographic shift characterized
by a relatively abrupt increase in the proportion of 5- to 19-year-
olds in cemeteries during the economic transition from foraging
to farming (Bocquet-Appel, 2011) – a phase referred to as the
“Neolithic Demographic Transition” (Bocquet-Appel, 2002). The
world’s population just prior to the emergence of agriculture was
perhaps around six million individuals (Biraben, 1979), compared
to almost seven billion today, multiplying by 1200 in 11,000 years
(Bocquet-Appel, 2011). The genetic changes that accompanied the
rise of agriculture – and they were numerous, as we are continu-
ally discovering (Cordain et al., 2005; Perry et al., 2007; Gibbons,
2009; Pickrell et al., 2009; Laland et al., 2010) – were effected by
the knowledge, specialization, and inequality in human societies,
as well as by the densities of people who began living in villages
and eventually in cities (Cochran and Harpending, 2009).
In modern times, the rate of gene–culture coevolution is poised
to accelerate even more dramatically as humans begin to direct
their own biological evolution through ever-increasing means of
horizontal cultural transmission (Brosius, 2003; Hawks et al., 2007;
Laland et al., 2010). One cultural source of this change is modern
genetic engineering, which in this century may, for those who
can afford it, lengthen life spans potentially by decades, elimi-
nate genetic diseases screened before birth, and enhance human
strength (Carlson et al., 2009) and possibly intelligence (Sisodiya
et al., 2007; Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009; Cheng and Lu, 2012).
Many rapid changes that humans face now, and undoubtedly
will in the future,are rooted in much slower changes that took place
in the past. In discussing these, we distinguish between the tempo,
or rate, of change and the mode, or kind, of change that took place.
Important in all of this is recognizing that cultural evolution can be
examined at myriad scales, and the scale at which we happen to be
operating at any particular moment conditions our perception2.
2A useful schematic, the Stommel diagram, can be used to depict the common phe-
nomenon of slower rates of change being positively associated with larger kinds
Analytically speaking, this is both a good and a bad thing. Various
levels of view allow us to gain different perspectives on change,
but taken singly, they lull us into thinking that one view represents
the totality of change. For example, evolution is often presented as
large-scale change that takes place over a long period of time. Such
a presentation, although not incorrect, is only part of the story.
Missing is the fact that the large-scale evolutionary results that
we see so plainly are the cumulative products of countless smaller-
scale, and hence much less evident, changes that occur continually.
Yet by themselves, minute changes don’t constitute the entire story
either because they leave out how changes in one part of a system
affect the operation not only of the entire system but also of down-
stream systems far removed temporally – a result often referred to
as “ecological inheritance” (Odling-Smee, 1988). Ecological inher-
itance does not depend on any kind of “replicator” but rather
on intergenerational persistence (often through repeated acts of
construction) of whatever physical – or, in the case of humans,
cultural – changes are caused by ancestral organisms in the local
selective environments of their descendants (Odling-Smee, 2010).
Population-genetic models demonstrate that this ecological inher-
itance can generate unusual evolutionary dynamics (Laland et al.,
2000, 2001; Ihara and Feldman, 2004; Borenstein et al., 2006; Silver
and Di Paolo, 2006).
TIPPING POINTS: CHANGES IN TEMPO AND MODE
Examining gene–culture interaction at various levels can lead to
the detection of rapid changes in evolutionary tempo that might
be signaling changes in mode as well (Laland et al., 2010; Rich-
erson et al., 2010; O’Brien and Laland, 2012). The ethnological
and archeological records are replete with evidence that the tempo
of cultural change is rarely constant, although there are few cases
in which it has been measured directly. How are scale and tempo
correlated? Is the apparent rapid emergence of a new form actu-
ally sudden or is it an illusion, meaning that the scale at which we
are examining something makes it appear as if the object is new
when in actuality it is the product of myriad small-scale cumu-
lative modifications that took place over a relatively long period
of time? Stommel diagrams (fn. 2) suggest a positive relationship
exists between tempo and scale in the sense that the faster the
tempo, the smaller the scale (e.g., Westley et al., 2001).
This same kind of question was asked in paleontology for
decades. Darwin’s notion of the evolution of species was based
on gradualism – the slow build-up of small-scale change over geo-
logical time – although his theory did not require that tempo.
Simpson (1944) opened the door on the notion of accelerated
tempo, and Eldredge and Gould (1972) opened it wider with their
concept of punctuated equilibrium. They argued that cladogenesis –
the division of a taxon into itself and at least one sister taxon – is
the general mode under which evolution operates (as opposed to
anagenesis, or the evolution of one taxon into another) and that
rapid cladogenesis is orders of magnitude more important than
gradualism as a tempo of speciation.
of change (Westley et al., 2001). Stommel diagrams suggest a positive relationship
between tempo and scale in the following sense: the faster the tempo the smaller
the scale. Another way of putting it is that slower phenomena in time are associated
with larger-scale phenomena in space, where “space” is widely interpreted.
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In the hominin archeological record, irrespective of the scale
at which it is being viewed, we would be hard pressed to see any
tipping points in terms of information storage and retrieval in the
one and a half million or so years that bifacially chipped Acheulean
hand axes were used by Lower and Middle Paleolithic hominins
across first Africa and later Europe (Scott and Gilbert, 2009; Lepre
et al., 2011). Change, yes (e.g., Vaughan, 2001), tipping points, no.
Maybe, to take a page out of Kurzweil (2005, pp 10–11), to those
hominids their future was “pretty much like their present, which
had been pretty much like their past.” But just as surely, all the
slow changes in stone-tool technology that occurred over hun-
dreds of thousands of years led to an accumulation that eventually
exploded across Europe ca. 45,000 B.C., a point usually referred to
as the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic.
That will be the second tipping point that we examine, and it
is worth pointing out that it highly visible because of the nature
of the phenomena that herald the change in tempo and mode.
Cave art, ornaments, and tools made from antler and stone, which
were part of the Upper Paleolithic Revolution (Bar-Yosef, 2002),
are physical elements and therefore preserve rather well. This visi-
bility stands in stark contrast to language, which does not fossilize
(Hauser et al., 2002). We identify it as a tipping point in terms
of information, but the timing of its occurrence is not well docu-
mented. As a result, it is more difficult to assess the tempo of the
effects.
Returning to the accumulation of technological change, stud-
ies of modern material culture have found that inventive activities
are discernible as a clustering in time and space of similar inven-
tions – literally, a “burst of variation,” termed stimulated variation
(Schiffer, 1996). Often, these bursts are associated with underlying
technological or social changes that make possible new approaches
to mitigating perceived deficiencies in products – a cultural process
Schiffer (2005) labeled as the cascade effect. Changes in the context
of cultural transmission, including the introduction of new cul-
tural traits or shifts in previously unrelated or marginally related
cultural traits, fundamentally alter tool traditions and their selec-
tive environments. This creates new adaptive spaces in which tool
traditions change in response to new selective pressures (O’Brien
and Bentley, 2011). A particular temporal dynamic goes hand
in hand with stimulated variation. Initially, variation increases
rapidly, as artisans experiment with designing effective forms – the
bursts. Subsequently, variation decreases slowly, as less-efficient
variants cease to be replicated (Lyman et al., 2008, 2009).
Rarely made explicit in models of culture change is the size of
a population, yet clearly the more potential inventors and clever
assemblers there are, the higher the number of solutions to prob-
lems there will be and the more chances there are for solutions to be
copied and spread (Jones, 2001; Henrich, 2004; Powell et al., 2009;
O’Brien and Bentley, 2011). Malthus (1798) understood that cul-
tural change is intimately tied to the fact that population increases
exponentially, whereas the food base increases only arithmetically.
Ultimately, excessive demands on carrying capacity yield a dra-
matic decline in population correlated with cultural phenomena
(including wars). Of course, the purely Malthusian approach leaves
out the cumulative, and possibly exponential, effect of more minds
working on communal solutions to problems that are more than
simply the sum of individual parts. Through this distributed-mind
approach – in essence, the creation of a super brain (Hoffecker,
2013) – we equate collective knowledge capacity with population
size, rendered in terms of the number of people communicating
and storing their specialized ideas.
The distributed-mind approach has had philosophical and
empirical ramifications (Bolender, 2007; Hausmann and Hidalgo,
2011). Philosophically, it suggests that population size has a direct
bearing on thought because what goes through an individual’s
mind is largely derived from other minds. Thus an individual’s
thoughts are but a sample of what is being thought around that
person. Empirically, it means that the tempo of cultural change –
partly a function of how much cultural information is preserved
and passed on – may, in most cases, depend on population size
(Powell et al., 2009). Technologically, it means that a modern econ-
omy serves the role of disseminating, aggregating, and sorting
the technological capabilities, yielding a highly non-linear cor-
relation between the number of technological capabilities in a
country and the number of products it can make (Hausmann
and Hidalgo, 2011) and/or between economic complexity and
per capita income. As we discuss later, an exciting new body of
work posits that increasing population size rather than changes
in biological ability may underlie some of the major shifts seen
in cultural prehistory, such as the Upper Paleolithic Revolution
(Powell et al., 2009) or the much-debated cultural capacities of
late Neanderthals (Zilhão et al., 2010). Conversely, population
bottlenecks are now proposed to reduce cultural knowledge collec-
tively, as Henrich (2004) has argued convincingly for prehistoric
Tasmania.
Just as more people are alive now than have ever lived on Earth
before, more technological change has occurred in the last decade
than cumulatively over the history of humanity (Beinhocker,
2006). We can certainly agree with Kurzweil (2001, 2005) that the
tempo of cumulative technological change has grown exponen-
tially over the last century. Following the well-known Moore’s Law
(Moore, 1965) for the doubling of computing power (expressed as
calculations per second per dollar, or alternatively as the num-
ber of transistors that fit on a silicon chip) every 2 years over
four decades, Kurzweil (2001) demonstrated exponential growth
in brain-scanning speed, the cost of DNA sequencing, the num-
ber of human genes mapped per year, and the shrinking size of
technology. His predictions have proven remarkably resilient.
Like Malthus, Stephen Pinker knows that exponential trends
cannot be extrapolated indefinitely, declaring that genetic
enhancement is not inevitable, nor is it particularly likely in our
lifetimes (Pinker, 2003). All exponential change has to level off
eventually, of course (Mesoudi, 2011b), often in the form of a
logistic curve exhibited by population growth or the diffusion of
new technologies (Rogers, 1964). The question, however, is when
change levels off, as the exponential nature of technological change
has arguably been true for thousands of years in cultural evolu-
tion (Beinhocker, 2006). In technological evolution, these logistic
curves can occur more or less sequentially, or with some overlap,
as the pace of change is punctuated.
How do we know when a curve will decelerate? Ideally,we would
extrapolate from observed exponential growth up to the present
into the full logistic curve of the future. The classic cultural-
diffusion model represents the probability of the adoption of a
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technology at time t as
p(t ) = (µ+ qF(t ))(1− F(t )),
where the parameters µ and q represent the degree of innovation
and imitation, respectively, with the assumption thatµ<< q. The
cumulative function yields the logistic curve, such that the rate of
adoption increases exponentially at first, then reaches a peak, and
then declines as the cumulative number of adopters asymptotically
approaches a saturation of the population of potential adopters
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001, 2010; Lamberson and Page, 2012).
This model, however, applies to the diffusion of innovations,
not to the creation of innovations, and hence tells us little about
the future of the exponential innovation rate in technology (Bent-
ley and O’Brien, 2011). Another problem, as Lamberson and Page
(2012) point out, is that exponential change is a smooth, con-
tinuous acceleration, not a form of punctuated change or tipping
point. More-accurate signs of tipping points are reviewed by Schef-
fer et al., 2009; see also Drake and Griffen, 2010; Scheffer, 2010)
as “early warning signals” for critical transitions, or true tipping
points that lead to new forms of behavior. With respect to the
time series of events, these signals include slower recovery from
perturbations, unequal rates of recovery in the different directions
toward equilibrium, and increased autocorrelation, variance, and
“flickering” in the time series.
Aside from this list of warning signals, we can consider some
tipping points of the past, including the very recent past, where
the mode of gene–culture evolution changed dramatically through
new forms of information transmission. We divide these into three
major modes. In the first, hominins became able to store and
manipulate information, arguably about kinship relations, within
themselves. They did it in a manner that determined the tree-
like organization of information storage in human minds. In the
second, humans began to store information outside themselves
in art, material culture, and later writing and now the Inter-
net. This allowed for an accumulation of information, but more
important, individuals began linking their stores of knowledge
to those of others, made possible by changes in social organiza-
tion. In the third phase, new knowledge is created outside human
minds by searching, manipulating, and combining accumulated
information through artificial intelligence.
TIPPING POINT 1: COMMUNICATION BETWEEN BRAINS
Among hominins, gene–culture coevolution has accelerated for
millennia, not necessarily steadily but in successive minor tip-
ping points that ushered in new magnitudes in the rate of change.
Looking back roughly two million years, the pace of this coevo-
lution would be gauged on the scale of hundreds of thousands of
years, as our digestive systems gave way to larger brains (Aiello
and Wheeler, 1995; Wrangham, 2009). Consequently, our social
organization allowed for a division of labor and a shared caring
of newborns, which is unique among primates (Hrdy, 2009). At
some debatable date – estimates vary from over a million years ago
to just 45,000 years ago – our brains enlarged, which the evidence
suggests facilitated engaging in social relations (Alexander, 1989,
1990; Dunbar, 1996; Bailey and Geary, 2009). Flinn et al., 2005, p.
14) view the evolution of this “social brain” (Dunbar, 1998, 2003)
as the result of “the diminished intensity of selection from extrin-
sic causes compared with the relative importance of selection from
interactions with conspecifics.” Integral to this social engagement
were signs, gestures, and eventually language.
Speech production was not a sudden phenomenon but rather
a point in a long process of co-opting preadaptations in the jaw,
tongue, larynx, and hypoglossal canal (Denes and Pinson, 1993).
Evidence suggests that the evolution of breathing control and
increased brain size could have enabled complex communication
by the time of the last ancestor common to both Neanderthals
and modern humans at about 600,000 years ago (Krings et al.,
1997; MacLarnon and Hewitt, 2004). Certainly both Neanderthal
and modern human populations shared the derived form of the
FOXP2 gene (Krause et al., 2007), which has been implicated in the
development of speech and language (Enard et al., 2002). But hav-
ing the capacity for complex communication and actually using it
are two very different things. Language, as we noted earlier, leaves
no fossil clues, which is why dating the origin of language has been
referred to as “the hardest problem in science” (Christiansen and
Kirby, 2003). That said, statistical analyses of linguistic diversity
and divergence are beginning to suggest an age of roughly 100,000–
200,000 years for the origin of language (Nichols, 1998; Perreault
and Mathew, 2012), which makes it contemporaneous with the
appearance of Homo sapiens as a species (Botha and Knight, 2009).
Similarly, detailed analysis of the distributions of personal items
such as beads from archeological sites across Europe suggests that
ethno-linguistic boundaries can be approximated for some Upper
Paleolithic cultures (Vanhaeren and d’Errico, 2006).
The advantages of language, as the beginning of information
storage in the minds of others, allowed hominins to live, hunt,
gather, and groom in groups and to gossip in the mating competi-
tion (Dunbar, 1996). By providing “much more efficient channels
of communication. . . language apparently increased the potency
of human cultural processes by orders of magnitude” (Odling-
Smee, 2006, p. 53). Although Chomsky (2002) and others (e.g.,
Pinker and Bloom, 1990) have argued that the existence of ambi-
guity in language proves that the structures and properties of
language did not evolve for purposes of communication, it is
now clear that ambiguity is a desirable property, precisely because
it allows for a communication system that is “short and simple”
(Piantadosi et al., 2012, p. 281).
In studies of the evolutionary origins of human language (e.g.,
Hauser et al., 2002; Corballis, 2011), recursion has often been pro-
posed as the central organizing principle that separates human
language from all other animal communication systems. Recur-
sion is a multi-definitional phenomenon (Fitch, 2010; Martins,
2012), but for our purposes here we can define it as “the ability to
take a finite set of ideas and link or embed them to form an infi-
nite array of thoughts, phrases, or expressions” (Gallagher, 2011,
p. 229), or, simply, the ability to place thoughts within thoughts
within thoughts (Corballis, 2011), similar to nested Russian dolls.
Recursion is both ubiquitous in human languages and unique to
humans. Indeed, recursive syntax of human language may under-
lie its semantics (Hinzen, 2007); this hierarchical compositionality
is what enables human cognition. If recursion proceeds from the
hierarchical structure of neuronal activity (e.g., Becker and Flaxer,
2008), it follows that some treelike organization of information
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retrieval in the human brain preceded language evolution (Hof-
fecker, 2013). In fact, there is evidence that other animals, includ-
ing honeybees (Gould and Gould, 1995) and baboons (Bergman
et al., 2003), possess complex hierarchical mental structures.
The human brain is energetically expensive in comparison
to those of non-human primates (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995;
Navarette et al., 2011), and it takes a lot of energy to “think.” Thus,
there have to be direct benefits from possessing a larger, more
expensive brain, one of which appears to have been the ability
to meet the cognitive demands of maintaining meaningful social
interactions within increasingly larger groups (Byrne and Whiten,
1988; Dunbar, 1996, 1998; Dunbar and Shultz, 2007a,b). For a
social brain, a central challenge, providing a corresponding bene-
fit, is to keep track of eligible and non-eligible mates or protectors
(Dunbar, 2009). This challenge is much more complex under any
known human kinship system than in any other primate species.
According to Hamilton’s (1964) kinship-selection theory, related-
ness is a central parameter in the maintenance of social relations,
cooperation, and mate choice (Cronk and Gerkey, 2007). In other
words, such choices correlate with genetic proximity.
In a wide array of situations where proximity is a key organizing
principle, one of the most efficient means of organization and dis-
tribution is through the use of treelike structures. Such structures
can self-organize in biological systems and be refined by natural
selection, as in the case of human vascular networks (West et al.,
2002), neural networks (Becker and Flaxer, 2008), and the hier-
archical group organization of social mammals (Hill et al., 2008).
This hierarchical organization also characterizes hunter–gatherer
groups, whose size versus frequency shows self-similarity over a
range of scales (Maschner and Bentley, 2003; Hamilton et al.,
2007). At the scale of individuals, the division of labor between
men (hunting) and women (gathering) is reinforced pair bonding
(Chapais, 2008; Hill et al., 2011; Walker et al., 2011). At a larger-
scale, the band serves as a social unit that often resolves tension
between dispersion and interdependence. At the wider commu-
nity level, humans sustain social relations through gift exchange,
marriage, and classificatory kinship.
Social primates such as baboons organize themselves through
hierarchical classification derived from individual rank and kin-
ship (Bergman et al., 2003; Hill et al., 2008), but because humans
are unlikely to know all members of their community, organiza-
tion is sustained by overlapping networks of kinship, marriage, and
friendship. Longer-term planning and greater need for informa-
tion about others’ intentions render language use highly adaptive
in human social organization. Given that the numbers of kin to
keep track of increase geometrically with genetic distance, and
that kinship organization is central to human reproduction, it is
not surprising that many human cultures organize knowledge of
kinship descent into simplified systems of classification (Cronk
and Gerkey, 2007; Jones, 2010; Kemp and Regier, 2012; Levinson,
2012).
As kinship systems serve a number of functions, they must be
adaptable, with many possible states (Lyon, 2005). This “entropy”
creates a challenge for explaining continuity (Sperber, 1985).
Classification trees provide a flexible solution. Some, but not
all, cultures have evolved to classify kin in treelike decent sys-
tems – “family trees” – but regardless of whether kinship concepts
emphasize descent, affinity, generation, siblingship, or other fea-
tures, graphical representations of the relations between kinship
terms typically display a treelike form (Kemp and Regier, 2012).
As with the narrow language faculty proposed to be unique to
humans (Hauser et al., 2002), kinship terminologies are intrinsi-
cally recursive, without reference to external social or biological
phenomena (Read, 2001; Leaf, 2005). Indeed, the recursive gener-
ative principles of kinship terminologies allow modeling to predict
the terminological positions of real kinship systems (Jones, 2010).
Language allows us to store information in other people’s minds.
As a result, the larger hominin groups became, the more infor-
mation, including kinship information, could be stored in the
collected minds of its individuals (Renfrew and Scarre, 1998; Pow-
ell et al., 2009). Alternatively, the smaller groups became, the more
likely knowledge would be lost. We return to this point below.
Similar considerations of population size bring new insight, for
example, into a fascinating current debate surrounding the Pirahã
of Brazil, whose language arguably lacks recursion (Everett, 2005)
and whose counting system appears rudimentary (Gordon, 2004).
These conclusions are heavily debated (e.g., Levinson, 2005), but
in the debate few have considered the fact that the Pirahã have lived
in very small numbers (hundreds) since they broke from the larger
native population of the Mura by the early eighteenth century.
TIPPING POINT 2: STORAGE OUTSIDE THE BRAIN
About 45,000 years ago much of western Europe witnessed a prolif-
eration of cave art, personal adornment, and rituals – what arche-
ologists refer to as the “Upper Paleolithic Revolution”(Bar-Yosef,
2002; Mellars, 2005). The roots of this proliferation appear to lie
in migrations of anatomically and cognitively modern humans
out of sub-Saharan Africa (Ambrose, 1998; Lahr and Foley, 1998;
Ray et al., 2005), where there is intermittent evidence of symbols
and personal adornment (e.g., shell beads and engraved chunks
of ochre and ostrich egg shells) that in some cases dates sev-
eral tens of thousands of years earlier (McBrearty and Brooks,
2000; Henshilwood et al., 2002, 2011; Mackay and Welz, 2008).
Regardless, there is no denying the explosion in creative expres-
sion that occurred in western Europe around 45,000 b.c., coupled
with the appearance of such features as long-distance exchange,
grinding implements (Wright, 1992), and storage facilities, espe-
cially in northern latitudes where underground freezing kept food
edible (Soffer, 1989). What caused the explosion? The answer may
not be what was in humans’ heads but in how the heads, and how
many heads, were interconnected.
Explanations for the Upper Paleolithic transition have long fea-
tured cognitive changes in the human mind (e.g., Mithen, 1996;
Klein, 2002), but we disagree, as do others (d’Errico and Stringer,
2011; Foley and Lahr, 2011). Rather, we see signs that demo-
graphic changes in human populations – changes coincident with
the arrival of groups out of Africa and their infilling of parts
of Europe – were directly responsible for the Upper Paleolithic
Revolution. Powell et al. (2009) used Henrich’s (2004) model of
cultural loss in Tasmania, to which they added stochastic and geo-
graphic elements, to show how chance clusters of local migrating
populations – similar to those in the Upper Paleolithic – could,
by exceeding the crucial population threshold, begin to undergo
cumulative cultural evolution over generations. The implications
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of these findings are radical. A larger local population meant that
more people were around to invent new ideas, build on earlier
ideas (the cumulative aspect of culture), and, crucially, pass on
those ideas before they were lost. This population aggregation
provided the critical “ratchet” (Tomasello, 1999) to push culture
to a tipping point.
An increase in local population density would have been partic-
ularly relevant if Homo sapiens 45,000 years ago possessed mirror
neurons that in part facilitated social interaction. The existence
of mirror neurons in humans is now incontrovertible (Mukamel
et al., 2010), and it is clear that they are not restricted to the premo-
tor and inferior parietal cortex of the brain (Keysers and Gazzola,
2010). The question is when they appeared in the hominin line.
Hodgson (2012, p. 358) concludes that the “mirror/theory-of-
mind system. . . was already in place before the appearance of
H. sapiens (ca. 200,000 years ago) and that the ebb and flow of
the archeological record during the Middle to Upper Paleolithic
reflects the various ecological conditions that affected behavior
as function of this neurocognitive substrate.” Regardless of the
timing, the relevance of local population size is inescapable: more
people would have meant more potential role models to imitate in
carrying out complex behaviors that were expensive to learn. Simi-
larly, however, a decrease in population can lead to the loss of skills,
particularly technological knowledge related to complex “tools
that are hard to learn to make, and easy to screw up” (Henrich,
2006, p. 776).
We argue elsewhere (Bentley and O’Brien, 2011) that what
Henrich (2004, 2006) and Powell et al. (2009) refer to as “cumula-
tive adaptive evolution” is essentially a niche-construction model
(Laland et al., 2000, 2001) with an assumed probability distri-
bution of skill levels, which feed back on themselves through
intergenerational learning, becoming more specialized as the accu-
mulated skill level increases. Boyd et al. (2011) refer to this as the
“cultural niche” – an interconnectedness of brains made possi-
ble only through social learning. The upside of social learning is
enormous. In contrast to organisms that can learn only individu-
ally, even when it is expensive and error prone, social learners can
tap the brains of others (Mesoudi, 2008, 2011a,b). At that point,
they no longer have to know everything, they just have to know
in whose brain the requisite information resides – Gamble et al.’s
(2010) “social brain, distributed mind.” Thus social learners can
“afford to be choosy, learning individually when it is cheap and
accurate, and relying on cultural learning when environmental
information is costly or inaccurate” (Boyd et al., 2011, p. 10921;
see also Mesoudi, 2008). This raises the average fitness of the group
as well because acquired improvements can accumulate from one
generation to the next (Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 1999;
Boyd et al., 2011; Perreault, 2012).
A key event that occurred in the Upper Paleolithic – begin-
ning perhaps as early as 40,000 years ago (Pike et al., 2012) – was
the storing of information on cave walls through painting (Leroi-
Gourhan, 1982; Whitley, 2009). Common themes included human
hands and large animals – aurochs, horses, and deer – that presum-
ably were hunted. Cave painting in Europe continued for several
tens of millennia, until at least the beginning of the Neolithic,
around 11,000 B.C. Writing, which began in Mesopotamia roughly
during the fourth millenium B.C. (Fischer, 2004), was used mainly
as a form of book keeping. Later, more-expressive writing then
became a specialist endeavor, meaning it was limited to a few,
from the priests of Mesopotamia to the scribes entrusted with the
Code of Hammurabi (Van de Mieroop, 2004). As writing became
a means of creative expression – from the Greek tragedies, to the
tales of Chaucer and the plays and sonnets of Shakespeare, and
finally to the novels of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries –
writing became a means for the few to communicate with many,
either through performance or later through readings by literary
societies (Bradway-Hesse, 1998). In doing so, this “library” grad-
ually became the hub of culture itself rather than just a means of
expressing it. The intricately connected web of broadcast media
that we see today is just the extreme of this trend.
Because of writing, the vast amount of specialized knowl-
edge in the world is perhaps a billion times the technological
variation contained in a prehistoric hunter–gatherer community
(Beinhocker, 2006). This specialization has intensified incredibly,
such that only a tiny fraction of people in the developed world
knows how to produce food, and modern urbanites can often spe-
cialize in quite arcane knowledge that would have virtually no
value for survival on one’s own or in the small groups of our
ancient ancestors. Culture has, to this point, provided the means
for even semi-isolated individuals to maintain a subsistence while
simultaneously engaging in other pursuits.
Today, many of those pursuits revolve around the Internet,
which in a way represents a return to the past, before mass
media, by making local craft traditions and self-expression pos-
sible again through uploading personal videos, blogs, pictures,
and social-network homepages. Cultural change has accelerated
not because of the larger network but because Web 2.0 motivates
many more people to create new ideas. The interconnectedness of
online endeavors – through blogs and social-network sites as well
as search tools such as Google and Bing – has not homogenized
culture, as some feared. Rather, it has fractionated it, as like minds
find each other to create cultural “niches” that branch off from
one another. Interconnectedness, paradoxically, allows groups to
differentiate by copying each other, which homogenizes the group
but further distinguishes it from all other groups. Instead of family
and political ties organizing people in geographic space, it is now
ideas and common interests that organize people online.
This change in tempo necessarily brings about a change in
mode of evolution because modern technology is no longer a
set of knowledge that people can teach to the younger gen-
eration in the way craftspeople apprenticed their children or
teachers taught pupils for millennia. The age-old vertical (inter-
generational) transmission is not nearly fast enough anymore;
instead, the majority of competitive technological knowledge must
be transmitted horizontally. Horizontal transmission will change
genetic evolution as well. Humans have entered a phase of evolu-
tion where not all phenotypic traits are inherited genetically from
parent to offspring – witness the case with plastic surgery and the
imminent and inevitable merging of humans with computer tech-
nology (neural-interface systems; Donoghue, 2008). It is also the
case for traits that up until now were genetically inherited, such as
strength, height, and intelligence, all of which look to become
increasingly horizontally transmitted with genetic engineering
(Bostrom, 2005).
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TIPPING POINT 3: MANIPULATING ACCUMULATED
INFORMATION OUTSIDE HUMANS
If information is easily located and strongly selected for utility, this
should lead to fitness. In this sense, information technology thus
becomes an“equalizer”(Ding et al., 2010) because it allows a larger
proportion of the population to be involved in finding, linking,and
generating knowledge – a necessary capability for modern national
prosperity (Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011). If, on the other hand,
information overload makes it more difficult to select the correct
information, no matter how easy it is to find, the result could
be more sorting and more clique-based fractionation (Evans and
Foster, 2011).
Information overload is not a recent phenomenon. Invention
of the printing press and the rapid increase in the number of books
suddenly available caused sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
scholars to wring their hands over the situation (Rosenberg, 2003;
Blair, 2010). What we see today, however, is exponentially more
problematic. So much information is available online that even
with ever-sophisticated search engines we no longer can peruse
even a fraction of it (see Mesoudi, 2011b). The increase in quantity
has meant that academics are prone to re-invent the wheel in iso-
lated niches, and journal articles are hastily published, with careless
review and even frequent typos (Simkin and Roychowdhury, 2003;
Evans and Foster, 2011).
Modern social learning yields ubiquitous right-skewed
“winner-take-all” distributions of wealth and popularity on a scale
the world has never seen (Frank and Cook, 1996). Other day-to-
day behaviors, however, still exhibit a regression to the mean (Kah-
neman, 2011), now demonstrated by big-data studies. Hence, even
though the number of Twitter followers is heavily right-skewed
(Cha et al., 2012), the actual textual contents of Twitter feeds con-
verge on average experiences that are obvious by definition. New
studies of Twitter and Facebook exemplify the unprecedented tech-
nological achievement of analyzing literally millions of human
interactions, but so far they are yielding somewhat banal conclu-
sions, such as that people awaken later on weekends (Golder and
Macy, 2011) or that influential people with influential friends are
good spreaders of information (Aral and Walker, 2012).
This is not a critique so much as an example of how “big data”
computer scientists effectively have to re-invent aspects of social
science from scratch when confronted with a literature so vast that
no human being could possibly read and comprehend it, made
all the more difficult because of different academic backgrounds.
The overabundance of information is alleviated only as computers
are programed not just to search through vast quantities of infor-
mation but also to perform hypothesis-testing science with the
information (King et al., 2009a). Humans, then, may not be lead-
ing the way in science, unless, of course, gene–culture coevolution
leads them to merge with computers. In the extended-phenotype
sense (Dawkins, 1990), this has already happened, as most in the
Western world would not do as well today without computers facil-
itating their communication, wealth storage, and work. Even more
striking, although perhaps not yet as significant in gene–culture
terms, is the physical merging of human minds with comput-
ers, as exemplified on the cover of Nature with the “braingate”
technology (Hochberg et al., 2006; Donoghue, 2008). Progress
on the brain–machine interface continues from there (Hochberg
et al., 2013) as researchers embark on the “long-term neurophys-
iological investigation in human cortex at the level of single and
multiple neurons. . . which has previously never been possible”
(Hatsopoulos and Donoghue, 2009, p. 252).
This leads to fascinating debates over whether science will soon
become automated by computers (Bostrom, 2003; King et al.,
2009a; Schmidt and Lipson, 2009), ultimately elbowing humans
out of the very process they created. On the one hand, it may be that
machines will never be capable of creative exploration of science
and only of what Axelrod and Cohen (1999) called exploitation, or
what most scientists do most of the time – which [Thomas
Kuhn] called ‘normal science’ and Rutherford called ‘stamp
collecting’. [This] does not contribute very much to the
advancement of knowledge; rather, this normal science sim-
ply fleshes out the consequences of the paradigms that have
been established by truly revolutionary advances. Even if
machines did contribute to normal science, we see no mech-
anism by which they could create a Kuhnian revolution and
thereby establish new physical law (Anderson and Abrahams,
2009).
On the other hand, machine automation has already been used in
chess, for example, where “there is a continuum in player skill, and
computers slowly improved with advances in computer hardware
and software until they now play at world championship level. . .
[T]here is a similar continuum in the ability to do science, from
what robot scientists can do today, through what most human sci-
entists can achieve, up to the level of a Darwin or Newton” (King
et al., 2009b, p. 945).
Humans have now created so much knowledge and skill out-
side their own bodies, in computers and information networks,
that that knowledge may soon feed back on its own into this
process. Anderson and Abrahams (2009) argue that progress in
science requires true outliers – those creative geniuses that fit
Thomas Edison’s inspirational one percent. Part of the debate
is the mystery over the origin and timing of genius. Gladwell
(2008) suggested that some geniuses, such as Cézanne, needed
thousands of hours of practice before achieving the height of their
skill, whereas others, such as Picasso and Einstein, made (arguably)
their most profound achievements at a young age, with very lit-
tle practice. Similarly, Galenson (2005) divided artists into two
groups based on an assessment of when they made their greatest
contributions – conceptualists, who are innovative at an early age,
and experimentalists, whose innovations come much later, after
considerable experimentation and refinement. Regardless, every
so often an innovation comes along that is rare enough to begin a
new paradigm in the true Kuhnian sense of the term (Kuhn, 1962).
As soon as a good new idea is demonstrated, many clamber to copy
it and modify it slightly. This alteration may underlie a continual
budding-off process as new, more specialized niches are created
and then developed (O’Brien and Shennan, 2010).
It might be better to view technology as an “autocatalytic”
process (Farmer et al., 1986; Kauffman, 1995). Autocatalytic
processes also generate logistic curves in terms of rate of change:
slow growth at first, when there is little product to catalyze its
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own formation, then a rapid acceleration as the product increases
and catalyzes its own formation, then a slowdown as all is con-
verted. In terms of the acceleration stages, genetic research could
be seen as possessing this “autocatalytic” feedback, for example,
when a new method of mutating the entire genome (Wu et al.,
2007) promises to boost the tempo of genetic research even fur-
ther (because the effects of more mutations can be tested in a
shorter time). Arthur (2009) recently elaborated on this idea in a
book on how new technologies are assembled from pieces of exist-
ing technologies, such that technologies share common ancestries
in the true evolutionary sense.
These are established concepts for evolutionary anthropologists
interested in hierarchical analysis of the material record (e.g., Col-
lard et al., 2008; Mesoudi and O’Brien, 2008; O’Brien et al., 2008;
Shennan, 2011). The treelike form of phylogenetic representation
makes it apparent how technological evolution is a similar branch-
ing process (Arthur, 2009) in which older, established technologies
give rise to a generation of “spin off” technologies nested within
them, which themselves give rise to another nested generation of
spin offs, and so on. The evolution of ideas also reveals this nested
pattern (Bentley and Maschner, 2000), but identifying the pattern
does not explain when the next punctuated transition will occur.
DISCUSSION
Cultural evolutionists, especially those who ponder possible gene–
culture trajectories of the future, are inexorably becoming more
interested in how non-linear change is inherent to evolution. As in
physics decades ago (Anderson, 1972), there is increasing recogni-
tion that the emergence of novel, large-scale cultural phenomena
cannot be reduced to a series of subcomponents. What might
loosely be referred to as emergence theory has made its way into
biology (e.g., Reid, 2007) and philosophy (e.g., Wimsatt, 1997),
although there clearly is a lack of consensus over what emergence
entails and even open hostility toward it – witness John Maynard
Smith’s remark that the study of complex adaptive systems is “fact-
free science” (Horgan, 1995). Change is still slow, however, as the
discussion in the social sciences approaches its own tipping point.
In anthropology, emergence, with a few notable exceptions (e.g.,
Reynolds and Saleem, 2005), has been anchored in an orthogenetic
reliance on progress as an explanation of cultural evolution: what
humans need, humans get in order to make their way up the ladder
of cultural complexity (O’Brien and Shennan, 2010).
Here, however, emergence has nothing to do with progress,
nor is it simply a theory of hierarchical arrangements, whereby
innovations can be scaled into components, subcomponents, sub-
subcomponents, and the like. Rather, it signifies irreducibility in
terms of scale. Much more so than is typical in biology, tempo
and mode interact in cultural situations to create a new source
of innovation at scales both large and complex – what Trigger
(1998, p. 364) referred to as the “unique, emergent aspects of
human behavior.” As Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008) point out,
a “cultural evo-devo” would address the emergent properties of
human behavior, focusing attention on the processes by which
novelties (tools and other human behavioral products) are gen-
erated by culturally transmitted information stored in the brain
and how this process interacts with macroevolutionary change
(Eerkens and Lipo, 2005).
Following the development of punctuated equilibrium in the
1970s (Eldredge and Gould, 1972), tipping points were explored
by social scientists and mathematicians interested in catastrophe
theory (e.g., Thom, 1975). For example, spurred by an interest
in the conversion to agriculture by hunting-gathering groups in
the presence of colonizing farmers, Renfrew (1978) showed how,
as external parameters (e.g., climate) change even very slowly,
quite abrupt transitions can nevertheless take place in human cul-
tural systems. Renfrew hypothesized a cultural system with several
possible equilibria in which multiple variables affect benefit in
contradictory, non-linear ways. Although individual behavior is
changing only incrementally over the generations, this can reach a
“bifurcation”point (Brock and Hommes,1997; Brock and Durlauf,
2001), where it is suddenly necessary to make a drastic change
in order to maintain the optimal behavior. Similarly, modern
technologies characterized by “network externalities” or “exter-
nal increasing returns” (e.g., Ormerod, 1998; Arthur, 2009) – such
as mobile phones or perhaps someday even genetic engineering
or cybernetics – often enter as mere novelties, but as the number
of adopters gradually increases, a point of cost effectiveness can
be reached such that the technology is then abruptly adopted en
masse. Indeed, more than a decade ago, Cabral (1990) showed
that network externalities could easily cause jumps in adoption
rates. Similarly, Brock and Durlauf (2010) have a fairly extensive
discussion of the effects of social interaction, which is a form of
social-network externality, on the shapes of adoption curves.
CONCLUSION
What can we take away from our brief foray into cultural evolu-
tionary tipping points in the storage and transmission of infor-
mation? We would offer the following. First, the pace of cultural
evolution has accelerated over time, much of it tied to the ways in
which humans have been able to harness and manage information.
Second, although it is easy to be persuaded that there was some
inevitability or direction to this harnessing and management, it
is true only in a retrodictive sense. In other words, we see noth-
ing in the archeological record that would have allowed us at any
point in the past to predict what the future might entail in terms
of information management. Third, of the three tipping points we
discuss, perhaps the most significant was the ability to store, and
tap, information outside one’s own brain, whether that informa-
tion resides in the heads of others or on a cave wall. Fourth, the
emergence of this ability was tied directly to local population size,
meaning that more people increased the odds both of new ideas
ratcheting up old ones and of passing those ideas on before they
were lost. Fifth, tempo and mode are both important components
of the myriad ways in which humans have stored and manipulated
information, but it is clear that changes in tempo can bring about
changes in mode of evolution.
Tempo and mode are only two of the myriad issues that have
as yet been inadequately addressed with respect to the origin and
spread of cultural innovation, yet they offer exciting entry points
into the discussion (O’Brien and Lyman, 2000). Certainly they
were central to much of the work undertaken in the field of pale-
obiology, which emerged in the 1940s, but they have been less so
in anthropology. Whether one views punctuated equilibrium as a
particularly useful model in understanding the origin and spread
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of innovation, there should be no denying that it calls attention
to the inextricable linkage between tempo and mode and the cre-
ation of tipping points. It also highlights the issue of scale and the
visibility threshold of innovations. And it appears to be a useful
template for understanding not only the last 45,000 years or so of
human gene–culture coevolution but future trajectories as well.
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